Backlash\u27s Travels by Sunstein, Cass R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2007
Backlash's Travels
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Backlash's Travels," 42 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 435 (2007).
Backlash's Travels
Cass R. Sunstein*
ABSTRACT
Sometimes the public greatly opposes the decisions of the
Supreme Court; sometimes the Court seems to anticipate public
backlash and even to respond to it when it occurs. Should a so-
cial planner want the Court to anticipate or to respond to back-
lash? No abstract answer is possible; the appropriate conclu-
sion depends on assumptions about the capacities of courts and
the capacities of those who engage in backlash. This point is
demonstrated through an exploration of four imaginable worlds:
Olympus, the Land of the Ancients, Lochnerland, and Athens. The
four worlds are based on radically different assumptions about
judicial and public capacities to think well about constitutional
problems. The proper analysis of backlash depends, in large part,
on the prevailing theory of constitutional interpretation and on
whether judges have privileged access to constitutional meaning. If
judges lack such access, backlash is a healthy part of dialogue
between judges and the public, and the judiciary should some-
times yield. If our world is Olympus, the argument for attention
to backlash is severely weakened.
Let us define "public backlash," in the context of constitutional law,
in the following way: Intense and sustained public disapproval of a judi-
cial ruling, accompanied by aggressive steps to resist that ruling and to
remove its legal force.
It is easy to imagine cases in which a controversial judicial ruling is
likely to produce public backlash. Perhaps the ruling involves property
rights, presidential power in connection with the war on terror, the use of
the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, the placement of the
Ten Commandments on public property, or same-sex marriage.
Let us simply stipulate that if the Court rules in a certain way in such
cases, public outrage could significantly affect national politics and un-
dermine the very cause that the advocates of the ruling are attempting to
promote. Perhaps the ruling would prove futile or counterproductive, or
produce overall social harm. Perhaps the ruling would set in motion forces
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of
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that would ultimately lead to its own demise. How should a social plan-
ner want courts to respond to the risk of backlash?
My principal claim in this Essay is that no sensible answer to this ques-
tion can be given in the abstract. Any judgment inevitably must depend
on certain assumptions about institutional capacities and characteristics.'
Under easily imaginable assumptions, courts should ignore the risk of
backlash and rule as they see fit. Under assumptions that are different, but
also easily imaginable, the restraining effect of backlash is highly desir-
able, and it is very good when courts are affected by it. The risk of back-
lash has sometimes proved a deterrent to desirable rulings from the Court; it
has also helped to deter rulings that are not at all desirable. If these con-
clusions are right, they raise serious questions about a tempting view within
the legal culture-that courts should decide as they see fit and let the chips
fall as they may. That view might ultimately be right, but it depends on
contentious judgments about the fact-finding and theory-building abilities
of both courts and the public.
As we shall see, those who believe in "popular constitutionalism"2 on
normative grounds might well be led to the conclusion that judges should
pay careful attention to the risk of backlash. For example, Larry Kramer
writes that under the original understanding, "[f]inal interpretive author-
ity rested with 'the people themselves,' and courts no less than elected repre-
sentatives were subordinate to their judgments."3 On this view, backlash de-
serves careful attention when it occurs. If judges anticipate backlash, they
would do well to limit themselves accordingly, perhaps by invoking jus-
ticiability doctrines to avoid the merits, perhaps by ruling narrowly, per-
haps by deferring to the elected branches.
If the argument here is correct, the claim that judges should attend to
the prospect of backlash stands or falls on particular judgments about consti-
tutional method and institutional capacities. If we believe that the mean-
ing of the Constitution is settled by the original understanding, then "the
people themselves" may be ill equipped to uncover that meaning, and judges
should pay little or no attention to the public's desires. But if we believe
that the meaning of the Constitution is legitimately settled by reference to
I Robert Post and Reva Siegel, this issue, argue on behalf of a model of democratic
constitutionalism in which courts retain a prominent role. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. __
(2007). Celebrating Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 550 U.S. 833 (1992), they seek to de-
fend the judicial role against some of its critics who emphasize the value of popular consti-
tutionalism. As we shall see, their illuminating discussion cannot be evaluated in the ab-
stract; a great deal depends on judgments about institutional capacities. I believe that Post
and Siegel have something in common with Bickel: they believe that, to some extent, we
live in Olympus. My principal goal here is not to question that conclusion but to clarify the
need for and nature of the underlying institutional judgments.
2 See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (contending that the public should create and contest constitutional
meaning).
I Id. at 8.
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moral and political judgments, and if courts are not especially good at mak-
ing those judgments, then popular constitutionalism and attention to back-
lash have far more appeal. My purpose, however, is not to indicate a final
view on appropriate response to the risk and occurrence of backlash.' I aim
instead to explore the grounds on which such a view must be defended.
I attempt that exploration through an admittedly unusual route. I spec-
ify a diverse array of nations, or lands, in which the analysis of backlash
must take a distinctive form. Unlike Gulliver, backlash is not a person; but
we can learn a great deal, I am hoping, by investigating backlash's travels.
I. OLYMPUS
Let us imagine a nation-call it Olympus-in which judicial judg-
ments are reliably right, from the relevant point of view, and in which public
opposition to those judgments, when it exists, is reliably wrong. To make
the example simple and intuitive, let us begin by stipulating for present
purposes that judicial decisions about constitutional meaning require moral
judgments of one or another sort.5 On this assumption, the constitutional-
ity of racial segregation, restrictions on the right to choose abortion, or bans
on same-sex marriage turns, in significant part, on moral judgments. Per-
haps the relevant practices are valid if and only if they can be supported
by reference to justifications that are at once legitimate and weighty. If we
suppose that judges can assess that question reliably, and that any public
backlash is based on grounds that are either illegitimate or weightless, the
argument for taking account of backlash seems very weak. At first glance,
the duty of judges is to rule on the Constitution's meaning by reference
to the relevant sources; if backlash occurs, it is by hypothesis irrelevant
to the judges' job.
The first glance is essentially right. For those who believe that our
world is Olympus, it is usually inappropriate for judges to attend to back-
lash. But things are not quite so clear, even in Olympus. To see why, con-
sider the debate between Alexander Bickel and Gerald Gunther about judi-
cial exercise of the "passive virtues," captured in the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to decide certain controversial questions.6 Bickel seemed to think that
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, If the Public Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges
Care?, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
1 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW] (arguing that deci-
sions should be based on a "moral reading" rather than specific original understandings or
majoritarian sentiment); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE IN ROBES] (challenging models of adjudication that deny the role of moral argu-
ments); JAMES FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR AUTON-
OMY (2006) (arguing that judges should perfect the Constitution to assure "deliberative
autonomy" and "deliberative democracy").
6 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the "Passive Virtues "-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Re-
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the United States is, in an important sense, Olympus. He insisted that the
Court's role was to announce certain enduring values-to discern princi-
ples that would properly organize constitutional life. Bickel believed that
courts were in a unique position to carry out that role. In his view, "courts
have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legisla-
tures and executives do not possess."7 Indeed, "[j]udges have, or should
have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the
scholar . . ." in thinking about those enduring values.'
To this extent, Bickel showed great faith in the capacities of judges
to think about what political morality requires. "Their insulation and the
marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to men's better
natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in
the moment's hue and cry."9 Thus, "[n]o other branch of government is
nearly so well equipped to conduct" a kind of "vital national seminar,"
through which the most basic principles are discovered and announced.' 0
Pressed by expediency and by short-term pressures, other institutions are
poorly equipped to understand what principles are required, at least by com-
parison with the judiciary.
Nor was Bickel especially enthusiastic about "the people themselves."
On the contrary, he wrote that "the people themselves, by direct action at
the ballot box, are surely incapable of sustaining a working system of gen-
eral values specifically applied."" In his view, "matters of principle" re-
quire "intensive deliberation" and should not be submitted to a direct
referendum. 2 It should be clear that this is an emphatically Olympian
conception of the role of the Supreme Court. What is perhaps most remark-
able about that conception is how many people have shared it in the decades
since Bickel first wrote.' 3
At the same time, Bickel believed that a heterogeneous society could
not possibly be principle ridden. Too much of the time, such a society would
resist the imposition of principles, even if they were entirely sound. In
this respect Bickel invoked the example of Abraham Lincoln, who seemed
to him a model for the Supreme Court itself.' 4 Bickel read Lincoln to be
unambivalent in his condemnation of the institution of slavery, but also to
believe that immediate abolition was impractical, simply because it would
meet with such widespread opposition. In Lincoln's view, the feeling of
view, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (criticizing use of justiciability doctrines to avoid princi-
pled decisionmaking).
7 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 25.81Id.
9 Id. at 26.
10 d.
1 Id. at 27.
2 Id.
13 See, e.g., DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 5.
14 BICKEL, supra note 6, at 66-70.
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"the great mass of white people" would not permit abolition. 5 In his most
striking formulation, Lincoln declared: "Whether this feeling accords with
justice and sound judgment, is not the sole question, if indeed, it is any
part of it. A universal feeling, whether well- or ill-founded, can not be safely
disregarded."'' 6
Bickel argued that the Supreme Court maintained a kind of Lincolnian
tension, and that it did so through the use of the passive virtues, by which
it stayed its own hand in deference to anticipated public resistance. In his
view, a court that invalidates legislative policy "must act rigorously on prin-
ciple, else it undermines the justification for its power."' 7 The same is true
when the Court validates a legislative action. 8 But the Court might also re-
fuse to decide. It might give the political processes relatively free play,
because it has neither upheld nor invalidated their decisions. In his view,
"No good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be prin-
ciple-ridden."' 9 The task of judicial review is to maintain both "guiding
principle and expedient compromise"' 0 - and to do so by staying its hand
in the face of strong popular opposition, however indefensible the oppo-
sition might be.
In response, Gunther was mostly aghast.2' In his famous phrase, Gun-
ther wrote that Bickel seemed to believe that the Supreme Court should
maintain "the 100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time. '2 By con-
trast, Gunther thought that the Court should be one hundred percent in-
sistent on principle, one hundred percent of the time. Accepting Bickel's
basic conception of the Court's role as the elaborator of sound principles,
he insisted that the passive virtues should not be invoked as a basis for
judicial refusals to invalidate unconstitutional action.
We should be able to see that both Bickel and Gunther write as if our
world is Olympus-as if the Supreme Court has special access to consti-
tutional meaning, understanding that concept in terms that acknowledge
the Court's creative role in discerning the governing principles. Both be-
lieved, moreover, that public backlash is not well founded-that it is es-
sentially unprincipled, a refusal to act in accordance with constitutional
commands. Undoubtedly they were influenced in this regard by their dis-
tinctive time, when the Warren Court was engaged in a series of projects
that seemed (to many) required from the moral point of view. Recall here
that Bickel's model frames the conflict as between Lincoln's moral com-
mitments and the intransigence of those who defended slavery. Recall too
151d. at 66 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 256 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)).
'
6 1d.
"7 Id. at 69.
'1 Id. at 70.
19 Id. at 64.
20 Id.
21 Gunther, supra note 6.
22
Id. at 3.
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that the ban on racial intermarriage is the problem in which Bickel praised,
and Gunther condemned, the Court for exercising the passive virtues.23
The simple conclusion is that to the extent that our world is Olympus, it
is not easy to defend the proposition that courts should care about back-
lash. The most that can be said is that even in Olympus, courts might plausi-
bly use the passive virtues so as to preserve the Lincolnian tension be-
tween principle and expediency. This is an important point, but it is merely a
qualification of the basic point, which is that because judges are right and
an outraged public is wrong, backlash deserves consideration only rarely
and only for prudential reasons.
II. THE LAND OF THE ANCIENTS
Now let us adopt different assumptions. Let us imagine that we have
arrived at the Land of the Ancients, in which constitutional meaning is best
understood in originalist terms. In this land, the meaning of the document
is captured by the intentions of the ratifiers,2 4 or perhaps by its original pub-
lic meaning.25 (We need not pause over the distinction between the two
approaches, even though it might be important in some cases.) In the Land
of the Ancients, all judges are self-conscious and unambivalent originalists.
Let us assume as well that the Supreme Court is especially good at
discerning constitutional meaning, thus understood, and that the public is
very bad at that task. Perhaps the public is essentially uninterested in the
outcomes dictated by originalism; perhaps the public is incompetent in
thinking about what originalism requires. When backlash occurs in the
Land of the Ancients, it is because the public's (legally irrelevant) judg-
ments of policy and principle have been rejected by the Court's (legally
sound) judgments about the original understanding. In this particular land,
some members of the public are skeptical of originalism as such; some
people reject the outcomes that originalism produces; many people reject
originalism because it produces the relevant outcomes.
In the Land of the Ancients, judges are entirely comfortable with de-
mocratic corrections to the outcomes required by originalism-at least if
those corrections take the form of using constitutionally specified chan-
nels to invalidate actions that the original understanding permits. Suppose,
for example, that if we refer to that understanding, the Constitution is best
taken not to create a right to choose abortion, or not to include protection
against discrimination on the basis of sex. If political majorities seek to
use political processes to protect the fight to choose abortion, or to ban sex
23 See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 71, 126, 174 (discussing Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985
(1956)); Gunther, supra note 6, at 11-13 (same).
24 See Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006)
(book review).
25 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997).
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discrimination, judges in the Land of the Ancients will have no complaint.
Of course such judges will not permit democratic majorities to defy the
original understanding-by, for example, denying African Americans the
right to vote or allowing legislation to have the force of law when it has
not been presented to the President. But originalists agree that these ma-
jorities can engage in constitutional change through the lawful use of the
ordinary channels for amendment.
If judges are right to commit themselves to originalism, the social
planner should not, at first glance, want the Court to take account of back-
lash. By hypothesis, the Court is correct on the relevant question and the
public is wrong. Indeed, the situation here is exceedingly close to the situa-
tion in Olympus. Even or perhaps especially if the favored interpretive
method is originalist, the public's views about the meaning of the Consti-
tution are irrelevant. The Court should rule as it sees fit, whatever the pub-
lic's response.26 With respect to backlash, we could easily imagine a working
alliance between Olympians, who read the Constitution in moral terms,27
and originalists, whose lodestar is history. The alliance is joined by peo-
ple with diverse interpretive methods who nonetheless agree that the Court
ought not to attend to the risk and reality of backlash.
But there is a counterargument, or at least a contrary consideration.
Perhaps a Bickelian approach is appropriate in the Land of the Ancients.
Perhaps a Bickelian could be convinced that originalism is the correct ap-
proach and that the original understanding exhausts constitutional mean-
ing-while also acknowledging that no society can be one hundred per-
cent originalist one hundred percent of the time. One reason might be the
existence of longstanding departures from the original understanding, some
of which were permitted, and others engineered, by the Supreme Court it-
self. Perhaps a theory of stare decisis, or of respect for settled social prac-
tices, is necessary or appropriate in the Land of the Ancients.28 If the nation
has long allowed independent regulatory agencies, or if the Court has
long banned sex discrimination, judges in the Land of the Ancients might
not try to change the status quo, even if originalism condemns independ-
ent regulatory agencies and permits sex discrimination. Perhaps such judges
are attuned not merely to reliance interests, but to a large set of consid-
erations of which public backlash is a part.
A variation on this view is Lincolnian. Perhaps there are quasi-Bickel-
ians even in the Land of the Ancients, who believe that adherence to the
original meaning is what principle requires, while also insisting that pru-
dence-understood as caution in implementing understandings rejected
by the public-has an important place. Even if in principle nothing can be
26 Consider the comments of Justice Scalia in Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).2 7 See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 5.
28 See Justice Scalia's admission of possibly proving to be a "faint-hearted originalist"
in Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 441 2007
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
said to support the public's resistance to judicial adherence to the origi-
nal understanding, the social consequences of judicial insistence on that
understanding might well be unacceptable. Those consequences are espe-
cially likely to be unacceptable if the public is genuinely outraged. It fol-
lows that originalist judges might stay their hand, at least if they can do
so without greatly compromising the rule of law.
Notwithstanding the large differences in interpretive methods, it
emerges that the Land of the Ancients is relevantly close to Olympus. There
is a strong presumption that backlash is immaterial. But there might well
be a prudential argument, in extreme cases, for anticipating backlash, and
for refusing to cause it, at least if the consequences would be very bad.
An Olympian judge might hesitate before declaring that the Constitution
requires states to recognize same-sex marriages. A judge in the Land of
the Ancients might hesitate before ruling that the Endangered Species
Act is beyond congressional power under the Commerce Clause, or that
racial segregation, if required by the national government, offends no provi-
sion of the Constitution-even if such a judge believes that the original
Constitution does not allow the Endangered Species Act and fails to for-
bid racial segregation at the national level.
It is true that in the Land of the Ancients, the views of the public
have no interpretive authority; they tell us nothing about what the Consti-
tution means. But a judge who works there might be willing to use doc-
trines of justiciability in order to avoid especially bad consequences. Cru-
cially, such a judge will want to see that the use of such doctrines can itself
be justified by reference to the original understanding. Perhaps the rele-
vant doctrines can be so justified, and perhaps they will allow courts some
room to maneuver. At the very least, an originalist judge might dare to
hope so.
III. LOCHNERLAND
Now let us alter our assumptions in a more significant way. In the
land that I now propose to investigate, things are closer to Olympus than
to the Land of the Ancients in the following respect: Constitutional meaning
is properly, or even inevitably, a product of the political or moral judg-
ments of the interpreter. Let us assume further that interpreters, to qualify
as such, cannot be freestanding moral or political arbiters; they owe a
duty of fidelity to the relevant legal materials. Nonetheless, these materi-
als contain significant ambiguities or gaps, so that ultimate judgments
often depend on contestable views about policy and principle. Let us as-
sume finally-and this is the key step, the departure from Olympus-that
judicial views about policy and principle are systematically unreliable
and that public backlash, when it occurs, is founded on good grounds, in
the sense that the public's judgments are simply better than that of the
Supreme Court.
[Vol. 42
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In short, we are now speaking of Lochnerland, in which judicial er-
rors are inevitable. How, if at all, should the analysis of backlash be af-
fected?
A. Judicial Error
It should be clear that under the stated assumptions, the social plan-
ner would very much want the Court to take account of the risk of back-
lash. By hypothesis, consideration of backlash will move the Court in better
directions. At a minimum, the social planner might insist that the judges
of Lochnerland pay attention to public judgments as they are reflected in
backlash-perhaps by staying their hand, or by invoking justiciability doc-
trines, if the risk of significant backlash is high. But the social planner
might well go much further. Indeed, the supposition that we are in Lochner-
land would help to explain the influential views of James Bradley Thayer
on the appropriate posture of the Supreme Court.29 Thayer believed that
the Court should strike down legislation only if the violation of the Con-
stitution was "so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."30 We
can think of Thayerianism as a generalization of the idea that courts should
anticipate backlash and be cautious if it is likely to occur.
But Thayer was far more ambitious than that. Thayer suggested, much
more broadly, that the Court should generally defer to the public's judg-
ments, and to their judgments about constitutional commands, unless those
judgments are palpably wrong.3" To say that courts should hesitate in the
face of backlash is simply to offer a modest specification of Thayer's
general view. It is a specification because Thayer's general plea for judi-
cial deference surely entails hesitation in the face of intensely held public
convictions; it is modest because those who ask courts to attend to back-
lash need not embrace Thayer's general position.
To be sure, Thayer's approach leaves a large gap, one that Thayer him-
self did not fill: By what theory can we tell whether there is a constitutional
violation? Thayerianism cannot possibly be a complete account of the judi-
cial role, because the question whether there is a clear violation depends
on the method by which the Constitution is read. We could imagine original-
ist Thayerians, who believe that legislation must be upheld unless the
violation of the original understanding is palpable. On this view, the leg-
islature would receive the benefit of all reasonable doubts in the face of
originalist challenges. We could also imagine Olympian Thayerians, who
29 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
30 Id. at 140 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (Pa. 1811)).
31 Id. For a modern version, see Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 1 am identifying here "the pub-
lic" with the public's elected representatives, who were Thayer's focus.
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believe that legislation must be upheld unless the violation of relevant moral
principles is plain.
But the core point is that Thayerian approaches emphasize the like-
lihood of judicial error. In Lochnerland, attention to the risk of backlash
seems obligatory, simply because it produces better results by stipulation.
In Lochnerland, it is highly desirable for judges to anticipate public back-
lash and to attempt to avoid it. The reason is that judges will do better, in
principle, if they defer to an excited citizenry.
It is sad but true that the judges of Lochnerland might not willingly
adopt Thayerianism or even attend to the risk of backlash. By hypothesis,
these are the judges of Lochnerland, and their judgments are systematically
unreliable. Such judges are likely to err while also being confident that
they are unerring. Perhaps the judges of Lochnerland think they live in
Olympus; it would not be the first time. But perhaps a norm or practice of
judicial self-discipline might be developed, so that fallible judges, made
alert to their own fallibility, adopt measures to limit their own mistakes.
Such measures might involve doctrines of justiciability, designed to re-
duce judicial intervention into American life; or minimalism, designed to
ensure a degree of narrowness and shallowness;32 or generalized deference,
designed to impose a heavy burden of proof and persuasion on those who
challenge legislatures.
B. Popular Constitutionalism, Jefferson's Revenge, and Condorcet
Let us revisit the idea of "popular constitutionalism"33 through the
lens of Lochnerland. Those who embrace popular constitutionalism might
be taken to suggest that constitutional meaning requires judgments of basic
principle and to believe those judgments are more reliably made by the
public than by the judiciary.3 4 A plea for attention to the risk of backlash,
and for judicial deference to backlash when it occurs, seems natural in light
of the more general view. And in this light, we can see the close links among
popular constitutionalism, judicial responses to backlash, and Thomas Jef-
ferson's plea for frequent constitutional amendment by an engaged citi-
zenry.35 If constitutional meaning turns on judgments of morality and fact,
and if those judgments change over time, a "living constitution" might
turn out to have a powerful Jeffersonian element-at least if the public, and
not the judges, breathes life into the document.
More ambitiously, we can even see a kind of "Jefferson's Revenge"
in American processes of constitutional change, to the extent that the rele-
32 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU-
PREME COURT (1999).
31 See KRAMER, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
14 In my view, this is part of the account in id.35 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CON-
STITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
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vant changes are produced through processes of interpretation that are
highly sensitive to popular judgments over time. 6 It is certainly plausible
to think that most alterations in constitutional meaning have stemmed not
from constitutional amendments, and not from freestanding judicial elabora-
tion of principles, but from social practices and constitutional doctrines
that show a degree of attentiveness to changing public perceptions and
commitments.37 Jefferson's Revenge, if it has occurred, can be found in
new understandings of the Constitution that, in the end, are a product of
the beliefs and values of successive generations.
In Lochnerland, the argument for judicial attention to popular judg-
ments in general, and to backlash in particular, might be fortified by ref-
erence to the Condorcet Jury Theorem ("CJT"). 38 The CJT says that if mem-
bers of a group are more than fifty percent likely to be right, the likelihood
that a majority of the group will be right expands to one hundred percent
as the size of the group increases. We can easily imagine a situation in
Lochnerland in which (a) large populations have a constitutionally rele-
vant judgment and (b) most individuals are more than fifty percent likely
to be right. If so, the majority is overwhelmingly likely to be right. If the
population assents to a proposition that is constitutionally relevant, judges
would do well to pay attention to them, perhaps especially if their convic-
tions are firm.
These claims raise many questions and serious doubts, not least from
the Olympian point of view.39 The simplest point is that in Lochnerland,
the argument for attention to popular backlash is very strong. When judges
make constitutional judgments on their own, there is a serious risk of error.
Anticipation of backlash and humility in its face reduce that risk. And we
can identify a sharp difference, in this light, between Lochnerland on the
one hand and Olympus and the Land of the Ancients on the other. In the
latter jurisdictions, there is no reason to think that most members of the
public are more likely than not to be right on a constitutionally relevant
proposition. Hence, judges lack an epistemological reason to care about
what the public thinks. In Lochnerland, things are altogether different.
36 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitu-
tional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
37 Cf EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3-8 (1949) (emphasiz-
ing that with analogical reasoning, changing judicial judgments develop in a way that is at-
tuned to social commitments).
38 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE
(2006).
19 See Sunstein, supra note 4. An obvious problem is that if most people suffer from a
systematic bias, and hence are more likely to be wrong than right, the likelihood that the
majority will be wrong approaches one hundred percent as the size of the group expands.
Judges in Lochnerland are not likely to be impressed with the wisdom of crowds; believing
that people are probably wrong, they might well enlist the CJT to suggest that the view of
the crowd is entitled to no weight. See id.
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IV. ATHENS
Now suppose that there is no particular reason to believe that judges
are especially good, or especially bad, at giving meaning to ambiguous con-
stitutional phrases. Let us imagine that we are agnostic on that question,
at least over long periods of time. We do not know whether we are in Olym-
pus or Lochnerland. For every Brown v. Board of Education,"° there is a
Lochner v. New York. 4 For every Dred Scott v. Sandford," there is a Bran-
denburg v. Ohio.43 No global assessment is possible. But let us suppose
that the Supreme Court operates in an essentially well-functioning democ-
racy, in which relevant judgments are made through a system that combines
reflection and reason-giving with accountability. Let us give this imagi-
nary democracy a familiar name: Athens.
In Athens the social planner might well insist that judges should pay
careful attention to the risk or existence of backlash.' The reason is that
backlash reflects the public's judgments about basic social questions-
the best conception of equality and liberty, the proper understanding of reli-
gious freedom, the role of property rights, the power of the President. For
democratic reasons, such judgments deserve respect whether or not they
are likely to be right. A self-governing people deserves to be ruled by its
own judgments, at least if those judgments cannot be shown to be wrong
in the sense of plainly inconsistent with the founding document.
It is here, in fact, that we might find another reason for Thayerian-
ism-a reason founded not on the risk of judicial error, but on the com-
mitment to democratic self-government. In Athens, that commitment might
well be taken to justify a high degree of judicial modesty. But even in Ath-
ens, a serious flaw in the use of this commitment to justify Thayerianism
is that it grounds its defense on a contentious view of what self-government
requires. 45 Perhaps self-government requires insistence on its precondi-
tions, including freedom of speech and the right to vote; perhaps judicial
review, indifferent to public commitments, can do well in ensuring those
preconditions .46 Perhaps self-government, properly understood, requires re-
spect for a wide range of individual rights.47 Perhaps judicial protection of
those rights is indispensable.
These are powerful responses to Thayerianism in any form. But if
judges do not have the capacity to make superior judgments on the rele-
- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
43 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
'A Compare the instructive treatment in Post & Siegel, supra note 1, emphasizing the
relationship between legitimacy and heeding backlash.
45 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 5.
'6 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
41 See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 5; FLEMING, supra note 5.
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vant points, Thayerianism looks much more appealing. At the very least,
we might be able to say that on democratic grounds, the Supreme Court
should, in Athens, be reluctant to rule in a way that produces significant
backlash-and it should attend closely to the existence of backlash when
it does occur.
It should be clear that popular constitutionalism is alive and well in
Athens. The commitment to popular constitutionalism is not founded on the
view, held in Lochnerland, that the underlying questions are likely to be
resolved correctly by the public and erroneously by courts. Instead the com-
mitment rests on a judgment in favor of (one account of) self-government
as such.
V. OUR WORLD AND WELCOME TO IT
We have now seen how backlash might be analyzed as it travels
through a set of imaginable worlds. For us, however, no simple conclusion
has emerged. It is both tempting and far too simple to contend that judges
should simply ignore the risk of backlash and refuse to attend to it when
it occurs. This was essentially Gunther's view, and it depends on the con-
troversial assumption that we live in Olympus (or perhaps the Land of the
Ancients). Undoubtedly Gunther was influenced by the context in which he
wrote, involving judicial efforts to vindicate palpably sound principles of
racial justice in the face of indefensible public opposition. But it should
be unnecessary to say that that context is hardly the inevitable one in Ameri-
can political life. We should also be able to see that Bickel neglected the
risk of judicial error in the announcement and elaboration of moral prin-
ciples, and hence assumed, wrongly, that the only reason for "prudence"
was to maintain a Lincolnian tension. The assumption was wrong because
judges might stay their hand not only for the sake of expediency, but also
out of an awareness of their own limitations and their capacity for error.
Which world is our own? That question cannot be answered without
making contestable normative and empirical judgments. One person's
Olympus will be another's Lochnerland. In any case our world does not
fit any of the ideal types, and for that reason it is not possible to reach
any unambivalent conclusion about the relevance of backlash. 48 But one
point is clear, and it involves the importance of distinguishing between
validations and invalidations. Much of public backlash operates against vali-
dations of statutory enactments. By 1953, Plessy v. Ferguson49 was widely
viewed as outrageous; the same was true of Bowers v. Hardwick5° by 2002.
The most visible public backlash in recent years operated against the Kelo v.
48 Sunstein, supra note 4, explores this issue in some detail.
49 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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City of New London decision," in which the Court offered a broad reading
to the "public use" requirement of the takings clause. In cases of valida-
tion, there is an evident remedy: The democratic process can usually elimi-
nate the practice against which backlash has occurred.
The point is hardly speculative. In the aftermath of Bowers v. Hard-
wick, a number of states took steps to decriminalize sodomy, whether homo-
sexual or heterosexual. In the aftermath of Kelo, many steps were proposed,
and some taken, to give greater protection to property rights. Perhaps most
visibly, President Bush signed an executive order that would disallow
national "takings" under circumstances permitted by the Supreme Court."
To be sure, any particular democratic corrective may be inadequate. Per-
haps the practice that the Court has allowed is accepted in one state but
rejected in the rest; if so, the practice of the particular state might turn
out to be intractable. Perhaps interest-group power operates to entrench
practices that the public largely rejects. Nonetheless, it remains true that
unjustified validations do far less damage than they might seem to do,
simply because a mobilized public is usually in a good position to respond.
Invalidations are of course quite different. If the Court wrongly strikes
down a law, and if the invalidation produces bad consequences, it is
difficult for the public to supply a corrective. Perhaps new appointments
will eventually change the situation. Perhaps the Court can be persuaded
of the error of its ways." Perhaps a constitutional amendment will be en-
acted. But to the extent that Olympus does not describe social reality, and
to the extent that ours is not the Land of the Ancients, the Court may well
have an epistemic ground, rooted in a sense of humility, for hesitating before
invalidating legislation if there is a strong risk of public backlash, at least
in the most extreme cases.
In light of the risk that the Supreme Court might err, we can now iden-
tify some of the relevant questions. If judges anticipate backlash, and tailor
their rulings accordingly, what would be the consequences? Would an-
ticipation of backlash produce undue timidity, in the form of hesitation in
vindicating constitutional requirements? Or would anticipation of back-
lash produce a salutary political check on misdirected judgments on the
part of the judiciary? Do judges have the capacity to predict public outrage
and its effects, or are they more or less at sea? Would consideration of public
51 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a valuable treatment of the controversy, see JANICE NADLER
& SHARI SIEDMAN DIAMOND, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY: KELO AND
THE PERFECT STORM (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 07-05, 2007), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 962170.
52 The order says that the federal government must use eminent domain "for the pur-
pose of benefiting the general public and not merely for the purpose of advancing the eco-
nomic interest of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property taken." Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Executive Order: Protecting the Property Rights of the
American People (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/06/20060623-1 O.html.
53 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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backlash produce both undue timidity and erroneous forecasts? Are the
public's judgments on morally charged questions more likely to be right or
wrong?
My goal here has not, however, been to reach a final judgment on the
normative questions.5 4 It has been to suggest the kinds of assumptions on
which any such judgment must be based. An understanding of backlash's
travels might well provide a place to start.
54 See Sunstein, supra note 4.
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